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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that the evolution of male preferences contributed to the dramatic increase
in the proportion of working and educated women in the population over time. Male preferences
evolved because some men experienced a different family model—one in which their mother was
skilled and/or worked. These men, we hypothesize, were more inclined to marry women who
themselves were skilled or worked. Our model endogenizes the evolution of preferences in a
dynamic setting and examines how it affected women’s education and labor choices. We present
empirical evidence based on GSS data that favors our transmission mechanism. We show that men
whose mothers were more educated or worked are more likely to marry similar women themselves.
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Boston, MA 022151. Introduction
Women’s role in the US economy has dramatically changed during the last century:
whereas at the beginning of the century women tended to have low labor force
participation rates, be less educated than men, and to exit the formal labor market
upon marriage, today almost 50% of the labor force is female, more women than
men complete college, and women make up some 36% of professionals.1 These
changes have been accompanied by an equally radical shift in attitudes towards
woman’s role in the economy and the family. A Gallup poll conducted in 1938,
for example, asked “Do you approve or disapprove of a married woman earning
money in business or industry if she has a husband capable of supporting her?”
A resounding 81% of men responded negatively.2 T h es a m eq u e s t i o np o s e db y
the General Social Survey (GSS) showed that this fraction had declined to 38%
of the white male population by 1972, 25% in 1982, and 17% in 1998.
What are the factors responsible for this profound transformation in the role
that women play in the family and in the workplace? The explanations that have
been proposed range from the liberating eﬀects of new consumer durables that,
as suggested by Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2001), greatly decreased
the amount of work required to run a household (e.g., washing machine, vacuum
cleaner, etc.), to the revolutionary eﬀect of the oral contraceptive (the pill) that, as
argued by Goldin and Katz (2000), facilitated a woman’s investment in her career
by almost eliminating the chance of an accidental pregnancy. It has also been
argued that the expansion of the service sector, with its attendant white collar jobs
and/or skilled-biased technological change, greatly facilitated this transformation
(see Goldin (1990) for this argument and Galor and Weil (1996) for a model that
relates skill-biased technological change to fertility and labor choices).
Is there, however, a causal relationship between the change in male attitudes
and the changed role of women? Our paper suggests that the evolution of male
attitudes may have played an important role in bringing about the transformation
in female education and work decisions. We argue that over time there was an
evolution in male attitudes towards educated and working women brought about
by some men experiencing a diﬀerent family model—one in which their mother was
skilled and/or worked. This experience, we suggest, changed male preferences
and increased the probability of skilled women marrying by making these men
either more attractive as spouses for skilled/working women or more interested
1US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, and Goldin and Katz (2000).
2Erskine (1971).
1themselves in marrying them (or both). The more favorable attitudes of these
men, in turn, aﬀected the relative attractiveness of becoming a skilled working
woman as compared to a woman whose work was primarily in the household. Over
time, this led to more households formed by skilled women, a greater proportion
of men with these alternative preferences, and an increase in the relative supply
of skilled/working women. Thus, the gradual transformation of the family—long
considered a source of transmission of moral, religious and cultural beliefs—itself
acted as a reinforcing mechanism of changes in women’s role. In this way, women
who worked (or obtained a higher level of education) set an example for their
sons, and thus made it easier for the next generation of women to follow in their
footsteps.3
W ed e v e l o pam o d e li nw h i c hw o m e nﬁrst choose to become skilled or un-
skilled, and then get married and have children or remain single. The relative
attractiveness of becoming skilled depends on relative wages, on the probability of
ﬁnding a good match, and on the idiosyncratic (utility) cost that a woman must
bear to become skilled. In our model, the probability of ﬁnding a good match is
endogenous and depends on the proportion of men who have skilled mothers. We
examine the dynamic evolution of the economy and show that over time the frac-
tion of skilled women who marry increases relative to that of less skilled women,
thus increasing the proportion of men born to skilled women.
The mechanism that we single out for attention is the transmission of diﬀerent
preferences in the family that changed the probability of marriage of skilled relative
to unskilled women and thus the attractiveness of being skilled and/or working
for women. This is undoubtedly not the entire story and other factors such as
technological change, the rise of the clerical and service sector, or the introduction
of oral contraception undoubtedly played important roles over diﬀerent periods of
time. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that historically the probability of a
woman with a college degree or above remaining single was a bit over 31% for the
cohort born in 1890 and graduating college around 1910 as compared to 7.8% for
her non-college counterparts. The same statistic for college-graduate men of that
3Of course, as more women joined the labor force and attended college, attitudes towards
these women changed in society at large. Our argument does not preclude this additional
transmission mechanism. We emphasize, both theoretically and empirically, however, the role
played directly by having a mother of a diﬀerent type. There is additional evidence that
favors parental roles as a transmission mechanism. Thornton et. al. (1983), for example,
ﬁnd that parental gender-role attitudes and parental education aﬀect their children’s gender-
role attitutides. Wilkie (1988) ﬁnds a similar eﬀect of mother’s labor force participation on
children’s gender-role attitudes.
2generation was around 10.2% compared to an 11.4% for non-college graduates.
A sw es h o wi nF i g u r e1 ,t h e r eh a sb e e nad r a m a t i cd e c l i n eo v e rt i m ei nt h er a t i o
of the probability of remaining single for skilled (college and above) relative to
less skilled (less than college graduates) women.4 For the generation born in 1950
(attending college around 1970), only 7.9% of college-graduate women remained
single as compared to around 5.5% of her non-college counterparts. This behavior
was more similar to that of men, for whom 7.5 % of college graduates remained
single as compared to 8.2% of non-college graduates.5 It is interesting to note,
as also shown in Figure 1, that it is only recently that the relative marriage
probabilities of skilled and unskilled individuals is similar for men and women.
Our empirical analysis provides evidence that supports our basic transmission
mechanism—the hypothesis that men tend to marry women who are similar to their
mothers.6 Using GSS data, we show that the probability of a man’s wife working
is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with whether his mother worked. Even
after controlling for factors such as the man’s age, income, education, and number
of children, his wife’s age and education, and various other family background
variables including location, we ﬁnd that having a mother who works increases
the probability of a wife working by 32 percentage points.7 Using similar controls,
we also ﬁnd that the education of a man’s mother, unlike that of his father, has a
positive and signiﬁcant impact on the years of education possessed by the woman
he marries.
In addition to the aforementioned papers that attempt to explain why women’s
education and labor force decisions have changed, our paper is related to several
other literatures. There is a large empirical and historical literature on women’s
labor force participation (see Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) and Altonji and
Blank (1999) for surveys). Goldin (1990) provides an extensive account of the
change in women’s role in the work place and its consequences for the evolution
4The general pattern is the same independent of the deﬁnition of skilled (more educated)
versus unskilled (less educated) that one uses.
5The ﬁgures above are for the probability of marriage before the age of 45. The statistics
for women are from Goldin (1997) and from CPS March Supplemental File. The statistics for
men are calculated by the authors from CPS March Supplemental File (several years).
6Since the work of Freud, psychoanalytic theory has claimed that individuals tend to choose
spouses that are similar to opposite-sex parents. Some studies (e.g., Wilson and Barrett (1987)
Geher (2000) ) ﬁnd empirical evidence that individuals tend to choose spouses who have similar
physical characteristics and personality traits to their opposite-sex parents.
7Del Boca, Locatelli and Pasqua (2000) using data from the 1995 Bank of Italy Survey, also
reports a strong positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of mothers’ working experience on the probability
that their sons’ wives work.
3of gender diﬀerences in pay since the beginning of the twentieth century. More
closely related is Goldin (1997) which provides an illuminating account of how
work, marriage and family options have changed over time by studying four gener-
ations of women. Pencavel (1998) examines the more recent history from 1975-94
and concludes that increases in own wages account for between one quarter to a
half of the increase in women’s labor supply (depending on the generation), with
the increased attractiveness of the marketplace relative to the household account-
ing for the rest.8 Costa (2000) examines the evolution of women’s paid labor
for several countries and Blau and Kahn (2000) examine the evolution of gender
diﬀerences in pay.
Our paper is also related to a recent literature that examines how preferences
are transmitted within the family. Bisin and Verdier (2000) examine the in-
teraction of the marriage market with the endogenous transmission of cultural
preferences. Galor and Moav (2002) argue that the (genetic) transmission of
preferences favoring quality over quantity of children helps understand the his-
tory of economic growth. Lastly, our paper belongs to a growing literature that
is interested in the eﬀects of how (and why) individuals sort in particular ways in
marriage, intrafamily interactions, and the consequences of this for the macroecon-
omy. Fogli (2000) studies the eﬀects of diﬀerent family arrangements on labor
market outcomes. Kremer (1997) and Fernández and Rogerson (2001) exam-
ine the consequences of marital sorting for inequality whereas Fernández, Guner
and Knowles (2001) use cross-country household data to examine the relationship
b e t w e e ns o r t i n g ,i n e q u a l i t ya n dg r o w t h .
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop a simple
dynamic model that endogenizes the diﬀusion of preferences and traces out the
dynamic evolution of the economy. In the third section we present evidence that
supports the idea that a man marries a woman similar to his mother. In the
fourth section we conclude.
2. The Model
The objective of this section is to develop a dynamic model that analyzes women’s
education and labor force participation decisions as a function of the endogenously
8Olivetti (2001) quantiﬁes the relative eﬀect of the increase in the returns to labor market
experience and of the decline in the gender wage gap on married women’s life cycle labor supply.
Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan (2001) study the eﬀects of the gender wage gap and divorce on
married women’s labor force participation.
4evolving preferences within the male population. The predictions of this model
should be consistent with the fact that over time women’s labor force partici-
pation has increased, women have become more educated, marriage patterns for
skilled women have become similar to that of unskilled women, and male attitudes
towards married working women have become more favorable.
We make a few assumptions that render the model considerably more tractable.
While we assume women can choose to become either skilled s or unskilled u,m e n
are assumed to have a homogeneous skill level. Men instead diﬀer in the type
of mother they have (s versus u). Their mother matters, as we shall see shortly,
as skilled women are assumed to transmit diﬀerent preferences to their sons than
unskilled women.9 Thus, instead of having four types of men and women, we have
two types for each sex, skilled (s) and unskilled (u), where type indexes education
for women and their mother’s education for men.
The timing in the model is as follows. First, given the distribution of men
(which is equivalent to that of their mothers’), women decide whether to become
skilled or unskilled. Agents then obtain a match in the marriage market with a
constant probability. Given this match, they decide whether to marry or to stay
single. Lastly, married agents have n children (on aggregate, half female, half
male), and decide how to allocate their time between work and the household.
Single agents remain childless. Hence, the education and marital distribution
of women in the previous period’s generation determine the distribution of male
types for this period’s generation. This, in turn, will determine the indirect return
to women of becoming skilled relative to unskilled in this generation.
2.1. Household Decisions
As shown in Figure 1, in the past skilled women married at a signiﬁcantly lower
rate than unskilled women—a feature of the marriage market that over time has
slowly disappeared. One possible explanation for this disparity is that skilled
women, for a variety of reasons, were deemed to be less attractive marital part-
ners than unskilled women. Another possibility is that skilled women were pickier
both than their male counterpart and than unskilled women. In this model we
tie together the fact that in the past men overwhelmingly disapproved of married
women working with the lower marriage probability faced by skilled women. As
9The preferences of daughters, on the other hand, are independent of their mothers. This is
of course a simplifying assumption as one important role that skilled women play is undoubtedly
transmitting diﬀerent preferences (gender roles) to their daughters.
5is shown below, the marriage "penalty" emerges endogenously as a consequence
of skilled women’s higher wages and the time allocation decisions that these gen-
erate.
The welfare of individual i who is married to another agent j, consists of utility
from own private consumption ci, some spillover αi from the spouse’s consumption
cj, utility from consumption of a household public good c, and utility from the
q u a l i t yo ft h em a t c hw i t hj as perceived by agent i, qij.10 Match quality q ∈
[−∞,∞] is assumed to be a random draw from a distribution Q. Each agent
is endowed with a unit of time which can be allocated between producing the
household public good and working in the market. We assume that given a total
time investment of T = ti + tj, each agent obtains c = Tn units of the public
good.11 Each agent’s private consumption is equal to her earnings, which is the
product of the time the agent spends working and her wages, i.e., ck =( 1−tk)wk,
k = i,j.
Agent i’s utility when married to agent j, V
j
i ,i sg i v e nb y :
V
j
i (wi,w j,q i)= m a x
0≤ti≤1
[(1 − ti)wi + αi(1 − tj)wj + β log(ti + tj)n + qij] (2.1)
where i takes tj as given and β>0, 0 ≤ αi < 1.




+ ηi + µi =0 (2.2)
ηi ≥ 0 ηiti =0 µi ≥ 0 µi(1 − ti)=0
Note that equation (2.2) implies that if wi 6= wj, then at least one of the agents
must be at a corner solution. We assume throughout wm >w f,w h e r em is male
and f = s,u indexes female wages according to whether the woman is skilled or
not and ws >w u. There are three possible cases: (i) wm >β>w f,t h e ntm =0
and tf =1 ; (ii) wm >w f >β ,t h e ntm =0and tf = β/wf ; (iii) β>w m >w f,
tm = tf =1 . In the last case, both spouses devote themselves full time to
the production of the household public good, so we will ignore this possibility
10One possible interpretation of the utility function is that individuals obtain utility from
their career in a way that is proportional to its status or success as measured by wages. In such
an interpretation, αi is the utility agent i derives from her/his spouse’s career.
11One interpretation of this good is children, where n is the number of children, and the total
time T invested in them determines their quality.
6and restrict our attention to the ﬁrst two. Note that in the ﬁrst case, the wife
does not work and instead dedicates herself full time to the raising of children
while the husband works full time. In the second case, the husband’s situation is
unchanged, but the wife works part time and raises children with the remainder
of her time.
We next characterize the utility of a married man, Vm, as a function of his
wife’s wage wf (maintaining throughout the assumption of wm >w f). Note ﬁrst
that for wf ∈ [0,β), the wife does not change her time allocation in response to
changes in wf (she is devoted full-time to household production), and hence there
is no eﬀect on the husband’s utility. For wf ∈ [β,β/αm], the husband’s utility is
decreasing as a function of wf;i nt h i si n t e r v a la ni n c r e a s ei nwf leads the wife to
decrease the amount of time spent at home thereby decreasing the man’s utility by
(β − αmwf)dwf/wf.F o r wf >β / α m, the husband’s utility is strictly increasing
in wf despite the fact that the wife is putting in less time at home. Figure 2.1
depicts a married man’s utility as a function of his wife’s wage for two diﬀerent
values of αm.
2.2. Preference Transmission
We assume that a skilled mother transmits preferences such that her son has a
stronger preference for skilled women than a man born to an unskilled mother.
There are several ways of modelling this. One possibility is to assume that men
with skilled mothers inherit a higher value of αm and thus obtain greater utility
from their wife’s consumption or, in the career interpretation alluded to in footnote
9, obtain greater utility from their wife’s career. Thus, men with skilled mothers
have αms >α mu (where i indexes the mother’s type, s or u) and therefore, as
shown in Figure 2.1, for any given wage, obtain higher utility from a match in
w h i c haw o m a nw o u l dc h o o s et ow o r k .
Alternatively, we could have modelled all consumption as joint and thus have
both spouses in agreement on the optimality of each other’s work decision, but
simply have assumed that men preferred women who are like their mothers in
that, for the same random draw q of match quality, they obtain higher utility if
the woman is the same skill type as their mother, i.e.,
qij =
½
Ahqf o r i = j
Alqf o r i 6= j (2.3)
where Ah >A l > 0 and i is a male. The ﬁrst modelling route has the advantage,
7however, that it also provides an explanation of why men disapproved of women
working—for a range of wages, it implies that women will make work decisions that
make men worse oﬀ.
Henceforth we assume that (female) unskilled wages wu lie in the interval [0,β)
(i.e., an unskilled woman is a housewife) and skilled wages ws lie in the interval
[β, b wf(αmu)) (i.e., skilled women work in the market as well as at home) where
b wf(αmi) solves:




guaranteeing that, for the same qij, men with skilled mothers prefer skilled women
and men with unskilled mothers prefer unskilled women. See Figure 2.1 for a
depiction of these various intervals.
Note that the fact that men born to skilled mothers like skilled women more
than men born to unskilled women does not depend on the wage range chosen.
Our choice of wage range for skilled relative to unskilled women, however, guaran-
tees that men born to skilled women strictly prefer skilled over unskilled women
and viceversa for men born to unskilled women. This is a suﬃcient, but not
necessary, condition to match the fact that skilled women had a lower marriage
probability than unskilled women when the proportion of men born to skilled
women is low.12 To summarize, we have:
b wf(αmu) >w s > c wf(αms) >β>w u (2.5)
Note that we have assumed that spouses are unable to compensate one another
and, in particular, that the higher-paid husband cannot “bribe” his wife to put
in more time at home by transferring income to her. This is not a necessary
component of our model, however.13 If a man could bribe his wife to stay at
home, he would still prefer an unskilled wife to a skilled one for a large range of
wages. For wf ∈ (β,β/αmi) every additional increment to time spent working in
the market makes the husband worse oﬀ—hence he will prefer an unskilled wife to
a skilled one. For wages higher than β/αmi, the husband would bribe the wife
to spend less time at work but still have her participate some time in the market
since the marginal value of the last unit of time spent at home full-time is β which
is less than αmiwf. Hence there will exist some wage greater than β/αmi such
12It is not a necessary condition given that skilled women are pickier than unskilled women
since, as will be seen later, they have better outside options.
13See Lundberg and Pollak (2001) for an example of location decisions driving ineﬃcient
outcomes in the household.
8that for higher wages a man prefers a skilled wife. Note that this wage would be
lower for a man born to a skilled mother than to an unskilled mother.
2.3. Marriage Decision
We next turn to the matching part of our model. The simplest way to model this
is as a one-period random search in which the probability of a given individual
meeting another individual (of a diﬀerent sex) of type j is given by πj,w h e r e
πj is the proportion of type j in that respective gender’s population. Matched
individuals each obtain a random draw of match quality q ∈ [−∞,∞] from a
distribution Q. Individuals then decide whether to stay in a match (marry) and
obtain married utility V
j
i as in equation (2.1) or to remain single whereby her/his
utility is given by:
U(wi)=wi (2.6)
that is, there is no household public good nor any externality from another agent’s
consumption.
Hence agent i will be willing to marry agent j iﬀ V
j
i (wi,w j,q ij) ≥ Ui(wi), i.e.,
iﬀ:
αi(1 − tj)wj − witi + β log(ti + tj)n + qij ≥ 0 (2.7)
where i ∈ (s,u) indexes the skill type of the man’s mother if i is a male or the
skill type of the woman if i is female, and similarly for j.T h u s , w e c a n s o l v e f o r






−β logni f j = u
αmi(β − ws) − β log
β





wu − αfwm − β logni f i = u
(β − αfwm) − β log
β
wsni fi = s (2.9)
for i,j = s,u.
The ﬁrst line of q∗
fi is the reservation quality of unskilled females, whereas the
second is that of skilled females. Note that male pickiness is invariant to his own
wage (since he works full time whether married or single) and invariant to female
wages if these are below β. For female wages above β, as discussed previously,
the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nf e m a l ew a g e so nm e n ’ sr e s e r v a t i o nq u a l i t yi sg i v e nb y
the sign of −αmi +
β
wf. Female pickiness, on the other hand, is always increasing





An immediate implication of the search model is that the greater is the fraction
of men with skilled mothers (λm), ceteris paribus, the larger is the proportion of
skilled women that end up married (since they are rejected a lower percentage
of times) whereas the proportion of unskilled women that end up married stays
constant (since both types of men have the same reservation utilities for unskilled
women). Note that in our simple formulation, the utility of a married woman is
independent of the type of man she marries. Nonetheless, the expected utility
of a skilled woman is increasing in λm since it decreases the probability of being
rejected when she wants to marry.
2.4. Education Decision
We next turn to the female education decision. We assume that a woman faces
an idiosyncratic (utility) cost of becoming skilled of γ where the latter is an
iid random draw from a continuous cumulative distribution function G(γ) with
support [0,∞]. Note that the probability of a woman meeting a type j man, πj,
equals λm if j = s and 1 − λm if j = u.










Note that pij is only a function of λm. Thus, the expected utility V i of a woman




















14This follows because both male types have the same reservation quality for unskilled females
in our simple model. Our results would all go through, however, if in a slightly more complicated
model men with skilled mothers had a higher reservation quality for unskilled women than men
with unskilled mothers. That is, the fact that the lowest reservation quality is q∗
mss does not
drive the results.
10be the relative utility of a skilled female (relative to an unskilled female) given λm.
Note that since wages are constant, the expected utility diﬀerential between skilled
and unskilled women is independent of the proportion of women who decide to
become skilled, λf.15 All women with γ ≤ ∆(λm) will decide to become skilled.
The equilibrium λf (λm) at any point in time is depicted in Figure 2.2 at the
intersection of ∆(λm) and γ = G−1 (λf).
The eﬀect of an increase in λm is to increase the expected utility of skilled
relative to unskilled women by increasing the marriage probability of the former.
Thus, as shown in Figure 2.2, the eﬀect of this is to increase the proportion
of women who choose to become skilled, i.e., λ
0
f (λm) > 0.T h u s , c o m p a r i n g
two economies with diﬀerent proportions of men born to skilled mothers, ceteris
paribus, the one with the greater proportion of these men should also have a
higher proportion of skilled women.
2.5. Dynamics
Let Fi(λmt) be the number of type i = s,u w o m e nt h a tm a r r yg i v e nt h a tt h e
fraction of skilled men at time t is λmt and that the fraction of skilled women
at time t, λft, is the equilibrium response to this fraction of skilled men, i.e.,






where Xt is the number of women at time t, πit = λft if i = s and equals 1 − λft
if i = u.

















15In a more general matching framework (e.g., one with more rounds of matching or in a
model of directed search), the utility of being a skilled (or unskilled) woman would in general
depend on the fraction of women who choose to become skilled as well, as this would inﬂuence
the search strategies of the males.
11i.e. iﬀ an increase in λmt produces a greater percentage increase in the number of
skilled women who marry than in the number of unskilled women who marry.
Proposition 1. λmt+1 is a continuous increasing function of λmt on [0,1].
Proof. Taking the derivative of (2.13) with respect to λm, it follows from
λ
0
f(λm) > 0 and from
P
j=s,up0
sj(λm) > 0 that ∂Fs





∂λm < 0.16 Hence (2.15) holds yielding λ
0
mt+1(λmt) > 0.C o n t i n u i t y
follows from the fact that λf(λm) is a continuous function.





















i.e., that when the proportion of men with skilled mothers is zero (and hence
skilled women face the lowest feasible marriage probability), the expected utility
diﬀerential between skilled and unskilled women is such that some women will
still choose to become skilled, i.e., λf (0) > 0.17 The following proposition follows
directly.
Proposition 2. There exists a non-zero locally-stable steady state. Starting
from λm =0the transition to this steady state is monotonic.
Proof. Note that λmt+1(0) > 0 and λ
0
mt+1(0) > 0. Furthermore, by Propo-
sition 1, λmt+1 is a continuous increasing function of λmt on [0,1].H e n c e a
locally-stable (interior) steady state exists and starting from λm =0the transi-
tion to the (ﬁrst) interior steady state will be monotonic.18
Figure 2.3 shows the dynamic evolution of the economy under the assumption




uj(λm)=0follows from the fact that both male types have the same
reservation qualities for unskilled women whereas
P
j=s,u p0
sj(λm) > 0 since men born to skilled
mothers have a lower reservation quality for skilled women than men born to unskilled mothers.
17If this condition does not hold, another steady state is λm =0(which may be locally stable
or not). An earlier version of our paper used a directed search model. In that version, despite
the fact that some women chose to become skilled when λm =0 , it was also possible for the
economy to get stuck at λm =0since none of these skilled women married and thus did not
have sons with diﬀerent preferences.
18There may be other interior steady states as well. A steady-state equilibrium with λm =1
is ruled out given that we allow the cost of becoming skilled to be unboundedly large.
122.6. Discussion
The predictions of our model are in accordance with several pieces of empirical
evidence. First, the model predicts that both women’s labor force participation
and educational achievement should increase over time. These two variables are
well known to have increased steadily over the century (see e.g. Goldin (1990)).
Second, the model predicts that over time the attitude of men towards married
working women should become more favorable, a pattern that shows up in the poll
data we reported. Third, a central prediction of our model is that the fraction
of skilled women who marry should increase over time relative to their unskilled
counterpart. This pattern holds not only for the college/non-college ratio that
we have shown in Figure 1, but also for various alternative deﬁnitions of skilled
versus unskilled. Lastly, the model predicts that over time the proportion of men
born to skilled women should increase. As we show in Figure 2.4, despite poten-
tially complicating factors such as diﬀerential fertility across education groups,
the proportion of (white) men born to women with college degrees has increased
steadily over time.19
It should be stressed that although we have chosen to model the transforma-
tion of preferences within the household as one that made skilled women more
attractive to men with skilled mothers, an alternative would be to model these
men as appealing more to skilled women. For example, if a change in male pref-
erences aﬀects the outcome of a bargaining problem in the family (say, over how
the woman allocates time between the home and the workplace) so that it be-
comes more favorable to the skilled woman, then one might expect these men to
make more attractive partners for skilled working women. From this perspective,
college women remained single in large numbers at the beginning of the century
because the men available, by and large, did not make for good partners.20 Note
that this assumption would have yielded the same predictions.21
19Figure 2.4 is based on 1972-1998 GSS data. It shows the evolution over time of the
percentage of white men born to mothers who have at least a college degree. Numbers are
obtained for six 10-year birth cohorts. The ﬁrst cohort includes individuals born between 1910
and 1919, the second cohort includes individuals born between 1920 and 1929 and so forth. In
the graph we report the information at each midpoint for the deﬁned cohort intervals. The
GSS data set is discussed extensively in the next section.
20An additional incentive for a skilled woman to remain single during the early decades of the
1900s was the existence of marriage bars which made it diﬃcult for women to work once they
married (see Goldin (1990) for a discussion).
21The data does not allow us to distinguish between the two assumptions since one only
observes the marriage outcome and not the rejection decisions of potential matches.
13It is worth noting, furthermore, that (following either modelling route) an
increase in the fraction of men with skilled mothers would lead to an increase in
the number of skilled women even if these men did not prefer them (i.e., they did
not have a lower reservation quality for skilled women then men born to unskilled
women). We could have allowed for an increase in the proportion of skilled men to
change the probability of marriage by a small margin, as long as a skilled woman’s
utility increased signiﬁcantly by marrying this type of man. This could happen
because a man with a skilled mother takes diﬀerent actions in the household that
particularly favor a skilled woman (e.g., he is more willing to cook and do the
laundry and a skilled working woman’s time is scarce). That is, the increased
attractiveness of being a skilled woman needs not necessarily show up in a large
increase in the probability of marriage; it is suﬃcient that the relative utility of
being a skilled woman increases.
3. Marrying Your Mom: An Empirical Analysis
In this section we provide evidence for the basic mechanism in our model. We
show that a man’s probability of marrying a more educated or working woman is
aﬀected by the education and work behavior of his mother.
In our model, a greater marriage probability for skilled women increases their
return to being skilled. Over time, this leads to a greater proportion of women
deciding to become skilled. As more of these women marry, the proportion of
men in the population with preferences that favor skilled women likewise increases,
leading to further increases in the marriage probability and hence in the proportion
of skilled women in the population. While we do not investigate empirically the
implications of the increased probability of marriage for women’s education and
work decisions, we do show that the basic mechanism highlighted in this paper
is at work, and that, as claimed by Freud, men indeed tend to marry women
who are similar to their mothers. Especially important to our argument, men
marry women like their mothers in the two dimensions that most matter to our
hypothesis—their education and work behavior.
Our empirical analysis is based on two sets of regressions. In the ﬁrst we
analyze whether the working behavior of a man’s mother aﬀects the probability
t h a th em a r r i e saw o m a nw h oa l s oc h o o s e st ow o r k .W es h o wt h a th i sm o t h e r ’ s
working behavior has a strong impact on the likelihood that his wife works even
after controlling for several characteristics of husband and wife and various other
background variables. The second part of the analysis examines the relationship
14between the education of a man’s wife and that of his mother. After controlling
for several characteristics of the husband, we ﬁnd that the education of a man’s
mother has a large and positive eﬀect on how educated his wife is likely to be,
whereas the eﬀect of his father’s education is quite small and/or insigniﬁcant.
3.1. Data Set and Variable Deﬁnitions
For our analysis we use the General Social Survey (GSS) dataset. The GSS is a
series of cross sections that have been collected annually since 1972 (except for a
few years) by the National Opinion Research Center.22 Each cross section contains
about 1500 observations, and respondents are asked about their demographic
background, political and social attitudes, and labor market outcomes. For all
the survey years, information on the educational attainment of both parents of the
respondent are collected. Information on the working behavior of an individual’s
mother and father was also collected but for a smaller series of years.
In the ﬁrst part of our analysis we are interested in understanding the deter-
minants of a wife’s working behavior, and how this is aﬀected by the working
behavior of her husband’s mother. For this purpose, we restrict the sample to in-
c l u d ea l lw h i t em a r r i e dm e nh e a do fh o u s e h o l d sw h o s ew i v e sa r eb e t w e e n3 0a n d5 0
years of age, as women in this age interval are more likely to have completed their
education and are still far from retirement considerations. The working behavior
of the wife, our dependent variable in this analysis, is captured by an indicator
variable (WIFEWORK) that is equal to one if, during the week preceding the in-
terview, she was employed full time or she had a regular job but was temporarily
away from it because of illness, vacation or strike and is equal to zero otherwise.
The working behavior of her husband’s mother, our variable of interest in this
analysis, is described by a dummy variable (MAWORK) that is set equal to one if
the man’s mother worked for as long as a year after her son was born and before
he was 14, and zero otherwise. This variable is only available for the years 1988
and 1994. Hence we restrict our sample to these two years.
We control for several characteristics of the wife that may inﬂuence her working
behavior such as her age, education, the number of children the husband has ever
had (CHILDREN), and the number of children present in the household who are
younger than age 6 (BABIES).23 Similarly, we control for several characteristics
22Davis, Smith and Marsden (1999) describes the content and the sampling frame of the GSS.
23The number of children is reported in the respondent’s questionnaire whereas the number
of children under age 6 living in the household is contained in the Household Enumeration Form
15of the husband that may inﬂuence her work choice, like his age, years of completed
education (HUSB EDUC) and income (HUSB INCOME).24 We also include in the
analysis variables that capture other characteristics of the husband’s background:
in particular his mother’s and father’s years of completed education (MAEDUC
and PAEDUC), the religion in which he was raised (protestant, catholic, jewish,
atheist or other) and whether he considers his family income at age 16 as BELOW,
AVERAGE, or ABOVE as compared to the American families in general.25 Fi-
nally, we include two variables that capture the location in which the husband
lived at age 16: the ﬁrst is a full set of dummy variables indicating the region in
which he lived and the second is a set of dummy variables indicating the type of
place where he resided.26
T h es u m m a r ys t a t i s t i c sf o ro u rs a m p l ea r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e3 . 1 A . T h e
average age of individuals in the sample is 41 for the husband and 38 for the wife,
these couples have on average two children, the husband is slightly more educated
than the wife (14.5 years of school versus 13.6) whereas his parents have similar
average years of education (both 11). Most of the individuals in our sample lived
in a city when they were 16. 55% of the men in the sample have a working wife
and 51% of them have a mother who was working while they were growing up.27
Table 3.2 describes the working behavior of the wives as function of the working
(HEF). The informations coming from the HEF are more detailed but their quality is inferior
(see Methodological Report 73) and the women in our sample belong to diﬀerent age groups.
As a consequence, we include both variables in the analysis.
24HUSB INCOME is labor earnings which is provided by the GSS in constant dollars
(base=1986) for the period 1974-96. This variable is based on categorical data; income is
calculated as the midpoint of the categorical variable.
25The GSS provides ﬁve categories for self-assessed family income. In addition to those
reported there is also "well below" and "well above" average income. Our BELOW category
includes "well below" and our ABOVE category includes "well above".
26The regional variable includes the following 9 categories: New England (ME, VT, NH, MA,
CT, RI), Middle Atlantic (NY, NJ, PA), East North Central (WI, IL, IN, MI, OH), West North
C e n t r a l( M N ,I A ,M O ,N D ,S D ,N E ,K S ) ,S o u t hA t l a n t i c( D E ,M D ,W V ,V A ,N C ,S C ,G A ,
FL, DC), East South Central (KY, TN, AL, MS), West South Central (AR, OK, LA, TX),
Mountain (MT, ID, WY, NV, UT, CO, AZ, NM) and Paciﬁc (WA, OR, CA, AK, HI). The
residence variable includes the following 6 categories: open country (but not on a farm), farm,
small city or town (under 50,000), medium-size city (50,000-250,000), suburb near large city and
large city (over 250,000).
27Note that working is a diﬀerent concept for mother and wife as we require the latter to have
had a full time job in the week preceding the interview whereas the mother is only required to
have worked for a year (full or part time is not speciﬁed) at some stage during her son’s ﬁrst 14
years.
16behavior of the men’s mothers. Note that having a working mother increases the
probability of a man having a wife who works from 49% to 60%. Table 3.3
describes the wife’s working behavior as a function of the type of place where her
husband resided when 16. Note that the wife is more likely to work if her husband
resided in the countryside or medium city (75% and 72%, respectively) and least
likely to work if he resided in a large city (38%). Lastly, Table 3.4 describes the
wife’s working behavior as a function of her own education as well as that of her
husband’s. A wife’s probability of working increases monotonically with her level
of education, from around 50% (high school degree or less) to 62% (more than
college degree). On the other hand, as shown in the next panel of the table, the
educational level of the husband ﬁrst increases and then decreases the probability
that his wife works.28
The second part of our empirical analysis examines the relationship between
the education of a man’s wife and that of his mother’s. We restrict our attention
to married white male head-of-households whose wife is aged 30 to 65 over the
period 1975-1994 and where we have information on the education of the man’s
parents.29 Since for this analysis we are pooling across 20 years of surveys, we
include not only age but also the husband’s birthyear (HUSB BIRTHYR) in order
to control for cohort eﬀects. We also deﬁne a set of dummy variables to allow
f o rn o n - l i n e a re ﬀects of education. We deﬁne education for individuals (WIFE,
HUSB, MA, PA,) as HS if they have a high-school degree or COLL if they have
at least some years of college, respectively for the wife, the husband, and the
husband’s mother and father.
Table 3.1B describes the summary statistics for our sample. On average,
husbands are 46 years old and wives are 42 years old. Husbands are slightly
more educated than wives on average but mothers tend to be more educated than
fathers; the correlation between husband’s mother and father years of education
is .645. Table 3.5 presents information on how wife’s education diﬀers by her
husband’s mother education and by her husband’s education, respectively. Men
with at least some years of college marry similar women 65% of the time whereas
men without a high-school degree marry women with at least some college only
28This is most likely due to the fact that the probability of a wife’s working decreases with
her husband’s income (and his education is positively correlated with this) but increases with
her education (which is positively correlated with that of her husband’s).
29A l t h o u g hi n f o r m a t i o no nt h ee d u c a t i o no fb o t ht h er e s p o n d e n t ’ sp a r e n t sa n ds p o u s ei s
available for all survey years, we restrict our attention to the period 1975-1994 where information
on all the variables we will use in our analysis were collected. In particular, in 1974 the age of
t h es p o u s ei sn o tr e p o r t e d .
17in 9% of cases; the correlation between husband’s and wife’s education is equal to
.613. Not surprisingly, a more educated mother implies that the son marries a
more educated woman. That is, men are most likely to marry a woman with at
least some years of college if their mothers have at least some years of college.30
3.2. Results
This section reports the results of our regression analysis. We show that even
after controlling for other characteristics that may inﬂuence marital choices such
as education, income, religion, region and type of residence, men whose mothers
worked are more likely to have a working spouse; men whose mothers were more
educated are also more likely to have a more educated spouse. A working mother
increases the probability that her son’s wife works by a signiﬁcant degree—from
39% to 71%. The eﬀect of having a more educated mother is also quantitatively
important; having a mother with some years of college increases the probability
of obtaining a similarly educated wife by 17 percentage points.
3.2.1. Working Behavior Analysis
We investigate the eﬀect of a man’s mother working prior to when he was 14











where the dependent variable Dw
it is an indicator variable that is equal to one if
the wife, during the week preceding the interview, was employed full time or if she
had a regular job but was temporarily away from it because of illness, vacation or
strike and is equal to zero otherwise. Dm
it is an indicator variable that is equal to
one if the husband’s mother worked for at least one year after her son was born
a n db e f o r eh et u r n e d1 4 ,Xit is a vector of household’s characteristics, including
the wife’s age and education, the number of children, the number of children
younger than 6 years, the husband’s age, education and income, the education of
the husband’s mother and father, the religion in which the husband was raised, a
self-assessment of his family income (parental), and two sets of dummy variables
30It is interesting to note that, controlling for other characteristics, a man is equally likely to
marry (as compared to remaining single) independently of his mother’s working behavior and
of her education.
18capturing the type and region of residence at age 16. εit is the error term that is
assumed to be normally distributed, with zero mean and unit variance.31
Regression (i) in Table 3.6 is our baseline regression; it controls only for the
characteristics of the wife and children in the household. We next add our main
variable of interest—MAWORK. Regression (iii) includes the husband’s charac-
teristics and regression (iv) also includes family background variables. Table
3.7 presents the results obtained for model (iv) augmented with the residence and
regional variables and also reports the corresponding marginal eﬀects.32
We ﬁnd that the probability that the wife works is positively and signiﬁcantly
related to whether her husband’s mother has worked for all speciﬁcations. Also
signiﬁcant are the number of children and babies in the household (negative eﬀect),
the wife’s own education (positive eﬀect) and her husband’s income and education
(negative eﬀect). From Table 3.7, we ﬁnd that the presence of an additional baby
reduces the probability that the wife works by about 22 percentage points. An
additional year of her own education increases the probability that the wife works
by about 10 percentage points. A working mother-in-law has a very large eﬀect
on the probability that the wife works: the probability increases by some 32
percentage points, from 39% to about 71%.
The speciﬁcation in Table 3.7 allows us to distinguish our hypothesis from an
alternative one that would argue that men are more likely to marry women who
end up working simply because, if their mother worked, then they are more likely
to have grown up in a place where many women work. In particular, one might
think that women who work in cities are more likely to work, either because of
social norms, self-selection or greater opportunity. Although we ﬁnd some of the
residence and regional dummies to be signiﬁcant, MAWORK remains positive and
signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
We also control for religion since men may tend to marry women from the same
religion and, if religion and work are correlated, then this may be responsible for
the positive coeﬃcient on MAWORK. Controlling for religion (coeﬃcients not
reported in table) does not aﬀect our results.
Lastly, it may be argued that a mother is more likely to have worked if her
31All probit regressions are run including a constant and sample year and estimated using
robust standard errors. For expositional purposes the coeﬃcient on the constant term and the
sample year eﬀe c ta r en o tr e p o r t e d .
32In the regressions, the omitted variables are OTHER for the husband’s religion dummies,
BELOW for his income self-assessment, COUNTRY for his place of residency at 16, and East
South Central for the regional dummies.
19family income was low, leading in the future to lower wealth for her son (via
bequests or other channels of wealth persistence). If, in turn, lower family wealth
makes it more likely that the son’s wife works, then the positive coeﬃcient on
MAWORK may simply be picking up the negative correlation between family
wealth and the wife’s working behavior. Unfortunately, our data set does not
have any information on the son’s parental wealth or income. The best we could
do was to include a measure of the parents’ income/wealth (compared to that
of the average American family) as assessed by the son. This variable is not
signiﬁcant once we control for parental education and in all speciﬁcations does
not aﬀect our results.
All the results are robust to alternative deﬁnitions of the dependent variable:
whether we deﬁne a wife as working when she works full time or part time, or when
she works more than 40 hours per week, we obtain similar results. Adding squared
terms for the husband’s age, the wife’s age and the husband’s income also leaves
our results unchanged. On the other hand, if we use as indicator of the husband’s
mother working history not whether she worked for as long as a year in the years
b e t w e e nw h e nh e rs o nw a sb o r na n dw h e nh et u r n e d1 4 ,b u ti n s t e a dw h e t h e rs h e
worked for a long as a year at any point after marriage, the results no longer hold
and the coeﬃcient on the husband’s mother’s work becomes insigniﬁcant. This
is most likely resulting from the fact that most mothers have worked for at least
a year at some point during their married life. A last alternative, whether the
man’s mother worked after he was born and before he started ﬁrst grade, also has
the mother’s working behavior entering positively and signiﬁcantly in determining
the probability that the son’s wife works.33
3.2.2. Education Analysis
We next turn to our analysis of the relationship between the education of a man’s











33It would have been interesting to also examine how characteristics of the wife’s mother aﬀect
her decision to work as well. We are not able to do so, unfortunately, since the GSS reports
information only on the working history of the repondent’s mother and spouse, but not on the
spouse’s parents.
20where Es
it represents husband i’s wife’s years of completed education; Xit is a
matrix of explanatory variables including the husband’s age, his birth year, his
earnings, education, the religion he was raised in, his self-assessment of his family
income at age 16, the type of place he lived in when he was 16, and the region
he lived in at age 16; Em
it and E
f
it represent years of completed education for
the husband’s mother and father respectively and εit is an error term that is
assumed to be normally distributed, with zero mean and unit variance. In order
to control for the presence of non-linear age or income eﬀects, we also include
quadratic terms in husband’s age (HUSB AGE2), birth year (HUSB BIRTHYR2),
and income (HUSB INCOME2) in the regression. The estimates are obtained by
using robust standard errors. Our hypothesis would imply that δ1 is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant, and larger in magnitude than δ2. In the regressions, the
omitted variables are OTHER for the husband’s religion dummies, BELOW for
his income self-assessment, COUNTRY for his place of residency at 16, and East
South Central for the regional dummy.
The results for the linear regression are presented in Table 3.8. The baseline
regression includes only the husband’s characteristics as explanatory variables. In
regressions (ii), (iii) and (iv) we add, respectively, the education of the husband’s
mother, the education of his father, and lastly both parental education variables.
In regression (v) we add to speciﬁcation (iv) two other background variables, the
religion he was raised in and his self-assessment of family income, and square
terms in husband’s age, birth year and income. Finally, in regression (vi) we also
add the residence and the regional dummy variables. Including the residence
variable should allow us to at least partially distinguish between the competing
hypothesis that a man with a more educated mother is more likely to have a more
educated wife simply because there were more educated women in the area in
which he lived.
As shown in Table 3.8, the husband’s education is a strong, positive and sig-
niﬁcant determinant of his wife’s education. Husband’s income is also positive
and signiﬁcant (although at the 10% level), for regressions (iii) to (v), as is the
coeﬃcient on the husband’s birth year (regressions (i) through (iv)). Column
(ii) shows that, conditional on her husband’s characteristics, a wife’s education
increases with the husband’s mother’s education. In particular, an additional
year of education for the mother-in-law would increase the wife’s education by
about 8% of a year. So, the presence of a mother-in-law with a college degree
would, ceteris paribus, predict that the wife’s education would be about 4 months
21greater relative to a mother-in-law with only a high school diploma.34
Column (iii) shows that the husband’s father education is positive and signif-
icant, although about half the size of the coeﬃcient on mother’s education found
in column (ii). However, when we include both the mother and father’s education
in the regression, column (iv), we ﬁnd that only the coeﬃcient on the mother’s
education is statistically signiﬁcant. Moreover, these coeﬃcients are statistically
diﬀerent from one another at the ﬁve percent signiﬁcance level. A similar re-
sult holds true when we add the husband’s religion, his family income at 16, and
square terms in husband’s age, birth year, and income (regression (v)). This is
the speciﬁcation with the highest predictive power. In this case, the coeﬃcient
on mother’s education is one order of magnitude larger than the coeﬃcient on
father’s education and we can reject at the one percent signiﬁcance level the null
hypothesis that the mother’s and father’s education levels have equal eﬀects. As
shown in column (v) none of the background variables included in the analysis are
statistically signiﬁcant. The asymmetry between mother and father education is
also found when we add the location variables, regression (vi).
The asymmetry in the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients on mother’s and father’s
education is important since otherwise one might think that these variables were
picking up some other characteristics of the son, such as the quality of his educa-
tion or his income, for which our variables are noisy measures. It is also worth
noting that it is not the case that mother’s education is a better signal of her son’s
earnings than father’s education. We ran a log wage regression on husband’s char-
acteristics and parental education and found that the mother’s education is never
signiﬁcant whereas the coeﬃcient on the father’s education is relatively small (and
becomes insigniﬁcant when we include square terms and residence variables).35
We have also run a series of ordered probit regressions for the same speciﬁcation
to estimate the eﬀect of parental education on non-linear categories of the wife’s
education. In this case we deﬁned the dependent variable as eit =1if the wife
34The magnitude of this eﬀect is quite large, especially if compared to the eﬀect of parents’
education on their own children’s education that is found in the literature. In particular, Card
and Lemieux (2000), using the same data set ﬁnd that one more year of parental education
increases a child’s education by about 20% of a year.
35We have also studied whether women’s marital choices are characterized by a similar asym-
metry in the importance of same-sex and opposite-sex parents. We ﬁnd that both mother’s
education and father’s education are equally important determinants of the education of their
daughter’s husband. Although we do not report these results here, they are available upon
request from the authors.
22has less than high school, eit =2if she completed high school, and eit =3if she
completed at least some years of college. We also recoded both the husband’s
education and the parents’ education according to the same speciﬁcation. As in
the linear regression, we study the eﬀect of the parents-in-law’s education on the
wife’s education after controlling for the husband’s characteristics.36
The results for the ordered probit regressions are summarized in Tables 3.9
and 3.10. We present the results in a similar way to the linear regression. We
report the marginal eﬀects associated with the speciﬁcation that has the high-
est predictive power (regression (v)) in Table 3.10.37 In this table the ﬁrst two
columns present the actual probit estimates for model (v) and the associated ro-
bust standard errors. The third column shows the estimated marginal eﬀects of
the explanatory variables on the probability that the wife has less than a high
school diploma (i.e. the ﬁrst outcome) and the fourth column presents the esti-
mated marginal eﬀects on the probability that the wife has at least some years of
college (the third outcome for the wife’s education recode).38 The marginal eﬀect
for the second outcome can be found as a residual.39
36The interpretation of the regression parameters for the ordered probit is as follows. If for a
particular regressor the parameter estimate is positive, then a higher value of the variable lowers
the likelihood of the ﬁrst outcome (that is, the probability that the spouse has less than a high
school diploma) and increases the likelihood of the third outcome (that is, that the spouse has at
least some years of college). The eﬀect on the probability of the second outcome is ambiguous.
37We choose not to report the results obtained for the speciﬁcation that also includes the
location dummies (Model (vi)) since, similarly to what found for the linear regression, it has
a lower explanatory power than Model (v) and Model (iv). The results for our variables of
interest are robust to the introduction of the location variables.
38The marginal probabilities for the model are the following:












































where Φ is the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal distribution, Zit is a




it), and γ is a parameter vector (γ =( β,δ1,δ2)). Note that the three probabilities must
add to one. The threshold parameter µ is estimated together with the vector of parameters γ.
39The marginal eﬀects are computed at the mean for our sample for continuous variables;
for dummy variables it is computed as the diﬀerence Φ(D =1 )− Φ(D =0 ) ,w h e r eΦ is the
standardized normal cdf.
23We ﬁnd similar results as for our linear regressions. The husband’s education
and income are always strong and signiﬁcant (at the 1 percent level) determinants
of his wife’s education. In addition, in the non-linear case, whether the husband
was raised in the Jewish religion is also a positive and signiﬁcant determinant of his
wife’s education. Moreover, we continue to ﬁnd the eﬀects of husband’s mother
and father education on the education of his wife asymmetric (although in this case
we cannot reject the assumption that father education does not matter). Note
that the presence of a mother with at least some college increases the likelihood
of a wife with the same level of educational attainment by 17 percentage points
whereas one with a high school diploma increases the probability of the same
outcome by 10 percentage points. The eﬀect of a father with at least some college
is signiﬁcant and it increases the likelihood of a wife with at least some college by
10 percentage points. However, we can statistically reject the assumption that
mother and father are equally important determinants of the wife’s education at
the 5% signiﬁcance level.
In our education regressions we are including individuals from many diﬀerent
cohorts. It is plausible that the way in which parental education and the wife’s
education are correlated has changed signiﬁcantly over time in a way that is not
captured by a linear birth year eﬀect. In order to investigate this question more
in depth, we construct three diﬀerent ﬁfteen-year birth cohorts. Cohort I includes
males born between 1915 and 1929, Cohort II consists of men born between 1930
and 1944, and Cohort III includes men born between 1945 and 1959. Summary
statistics of our data are presented in the appendix.
We ran both the linear and the ordered probit regressions separately for each
cohort, creating our sample, as described previously, by pooling from the cross
sectional data those men who were born within the deﬁned time interval. Our
results show that for all cohorts, the husband’s education and income are a strong
and signiﬁcant determinant of his wife’s education. Moreover, for the linear spec-
iﬁcation, we ﬁnd the asymmetry between mother and father education for every
cohort. The husband’s mother’s education is always a signiﬁcant determinant
of the wife’s education whereas the father’s education is not. However, for the
non-linear speciﬁcation we ﬁnd that the relative importance of mother and father
substantially changed over time. In this case, for the ﬁrst two cohorts, only
mother’s education is statistically signiﬁcant. However, for the most recent co-
hort, Cohort III, both mother’s and father’s education are statistically signiﬁcant.
In particular, either the mother or father having at least some college equally
increases the probability of marrying a woman with at least some college.
24Table 3.11 summarizes the estimated marginal eﬀects of our explanatory vari-
ables on the probability that the wife has less than a high school diploma, or
some years of college across cohorts for model (v).40 In this table the ﬁrst three
columns present the estimated marginal eﬀects of the explanatory variables on
the probability that the wife has less than a high school diploma (i.e. the ﬁrst
outcome) for Cohort I, II, and III respectively. Similarly, the last three columns
present the estimated marginal eﬀects on the probability that the wife has at least
some years of college (the third outcome for the wife’s education recode).
For Cohort I the presence of a mother-in-law with a high school diploma sta-
tistically increases the probability that the wife has at least some years of college
by about 10 percentage points, whereas the probability increases by 13 percent-
age points if she has at least some college. For the second Cohort a mother
with at least some college increases the likelihood of a wife with the same level of
educational attainment by about 16 percentage points whereas one with a high
school diploma increases the probability of the same outcome by 10 percentage
points. For both cohorts, the eﬀect of the father is much smaller and not sig-
niﬁcant. Finally, for the third cohort the presence of a mother with at least
some college increases the likelihood of a wife with some college by 15 percentage
point. However, for this cohort the eﬀect of a father with at least some college
becomes signiﬁcant and equal in size to the eﬀect of a similarly educated mother
(14 percentage points).
4. Conclusion
Over the last century, society has been deeply transformed: not only is women’s
economic role radically diﬀerent, but a new family model has emerged and in-
dividuals’ expectations and preferences toward marriage and gender roles have
evolved in important ways. If, at the beginning of the century, the vast majority
of men did not consider it appropriate for a married woman to work and women
were predominantly housewives with lower levels of education than men, today
most men approve of married women who work, women graduate from college
at a higher rate than men, and women are able to combine, for the most part,
40Model (v) has the highest predictive power for both Cohort II and Cohort III. However,
for the ﬁrst cohort, the regression that also includes location variables, Model (vi), has the
highest predictive power (although the estimates of the parameters of interest are unaltered).
We choose to report the results obtained for Model (v) in order to allow comparisons across
cohorts.
25marriage and a career.41
Standard explanations of the changed economic role of women have abstracted
from this change in attitudes and have focused on technological factors: the intro-
duction of time-saving consumer durables that reduced the time required to carry
out traditional tasks in the household, the advent of the pill that enabled women
to control fertility, and the shift toward a service and skill-intensive economy that
increased the proportion of jobs suitable for women.
In this paper we abstract from technological change and bring the role of pref-
erences to the forefront. Our paper argues that the spread of diﬀerent preferences
can be an important determinant of the last century’s profound transformation
of the economy in terms of observed marriage patterns, attitudes and women’s
economic role. We propose that male preferences evolved over time through in-
creased exposure to a new family model in which the woman played a diﬀerent
role. Having a diﬀerent type of mother aﬀected a son’s preferences, increasing
his probability of marrying a skilled/working woman. This mechanism, which
is in accordance with a psychological and sociological literature that claims that
individuals tend to replicate the patterns they experienced in their family of ori-
gin, provides a new perspective on our society’s evolution: at the beginning of
the century a large fraction of skilled women remained single (compared to their
less educated counterpart) and most women did not invest in higher education
and when married tended not to work. Nonetheless, the few educated women
who did marry, work and have children set a new role model for their sons so
that the next generation of men was characterized by a higher fraction who pre-
ferred a skilled wife. Thus, generation by generation, the economy was gradually
transformed: men’s preferences evolved, marriage patterns changed and women in
higher number entered college, decided to work and were able to combine family
and career.
We construct a model that allows us to study the dynamic diﬀusion of these
new preferences in society and which generates predictions that are in accordance
with the patterns found in the data. In our framework, male preferences inﬂuence
women’s education and labor decisions through their eﬀect on women’s marital
prospects. Men with skilled working mothers prefer similar women. The endo-
geneous diﬀusion of these preferences in society over time is determined by the
marriage patterns and education decisions that emerge in equilibrium. We show
41The extent to which professional women are able to successfully combine children and a
career is currently the topic of hot debate as witnessed by the success of the recent book by
Hewlett.
26that, starting from a situation in which there is only a small proportion of this
“new” type of men, the economy evolves monotonically towards its steady state.
During the transition path, marriage patterns and attitudes change so that skilled
women are more likely to marry than previously, more women become educated,
and female labor force participation increases.
Our empirical work supports the mechanism that the model highlights. Using
the GSS, we provide evidence that men whose mothers were educated or worked
are, ceteris paribus, more likely to marry women who also are educated and work.
Men do indeed tend to marry women who are similar to their mothers in these two
important dimensions. We show that this is true even after controlling for other
factors that may inﬂuence marital choices such as education, income, religion,
region and type of residence. Having a mother who works increases the probability
that the son’s wife works by a signiﬁcant degree—from 39% to 71%. The eﬀect of
having a more educated mother is also quantitatively important; a mother with
some years of college increases the probability of obtaining a similarly educated
wife by 17 percentage points.
We see many possible directions for future research. It would be of inter-
est, for example, to quantitatively assess the contribution of this new preference
channel relative to changed behavior brought about by increased female wages or
through the technological channels mentioned previously. Investigating variation
in women’s labor force participation across US states or across countries (initially
due to, say, an “exogenous” factor such as diﬀerent mobilization rates of men in
World War II), may also allow us to examine whether the macroeconomic evidence
supports our hypothesis. We leave these questions for further research.
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Figure 1 Ratio of Percentage Never−Married Individuals with College Degree
                    to Percentage Never−Married Individuals with No College.









Source: CPS March Supplemental Files (1965, 1970, 1980, 1990, 1999).
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Source: General Social Survey (GSS) data, 1972-1998
Figure 2.4    Percentage of Men Born to Women with College Degree                                      
             White Men, 1915 to 1965 Birth Cohorts                             Table 3.1a Summary Characteristics in the Work Regression
Variable Sample Means Variables Sample Means
(Std. Dev.)
WIFEWORK .547 PROTESTANT .610
CATHOLIC .314
MAWORK .509 JEWISH .019
ATHEIST .038
WIFE AGE 37.96 BELOW .233
(5.57) AVERAGE .579
WIFE EDUC 13.59 ABOVE .189
(2.39) COUNTRY .126
CHILDREN 2.17 FARM .101
(1.38) SM CITY .390
BABIES .365 MED CITY .157
(.688) SUBURBS .145
HUSB AGE 41.09 LG CITY .082
(6.55) NEW ENGLAND .038
HUSB EDUC 14.50 MID. ATLANTIC .201
(2.93) E.N. CENTRAL .233
HUSB INCOME 33189.77 W.N. CENTRAL .088
(21204.86) S. ATLANTIC .126
MAEDUC 11.36 E.S. CENTRAL .057
(3.13) W.S. CENTRAL .132
PAEDUC 11.18 MOUNTAIN .063
(3.81) PACIFIC .063
Number of observations 191Table 3.1b Summary Characteristics in the Education Regression
Variable Sample Means Variables Sample Means
(Std. Dev.)
HUSB INCOME 35713.89 PROTESTANT .652
(25722.35) CATHOLIC .284
HUSB AGE 45.67 JEWISH .028
(9.89) ATHEIST .028
HUSB BIRTHYR 1939 BELOW .275
(11.8) AVERAGE .530
HUSB EDUC 13.62 ABOVE .195
(3.07) COUNTRY .113
WIFE AGE 42.51 FARM .203
(9.17) SM CITY .332
WIFE EDUC 13.08 MED CITY .132
(2.45) SUBURBS .099
MAEDUC 10.44 LG CITY .121
(3.32) NEW ENGLAND .061
PAEDUC 9.88 MID ATLANTIC .182
(4.07) E.N. CENTRAL .235
HUSB HS .315 W.N. CENTRAL .105
HUSB COLL .533 S. ATLANTIC .141
WIFE HS .442 E.S. CENTRAL .063
WIFE COLL .426 W.S. CENTRAL .077
MAHS .396 MOUNTAIN .052
MACOLL .152 PACIFIC .084
PAHS .248
PACOLL .191
Number of observations 2368Table 3.2 : Wife’s Working Behavior by Mother’s Working Behavior
WIFEWORK MAWORK % in population
NO YES
NO 51.28 39.51 45.28
YES 48.72 60.49 54.72
Total 100 100
% in population 49.06 50.94
χ2(1) = 3.84 Pr= 0.050
Table 3.3 : Wife’s Working Behavior by Husband’s Residence at Age 16
WIFEWORK HUSBAND’S RESIDENCE
Country Farm Sm City Med City Suburbs Lg City
NO 25.00 43.75 50.00 28.00 60.87 61.54
YES 75.00 56.25 50.00 72.00 39.13 38.46
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
% in population 12.58 10.06 38.99 15.72 14.47 8.18Table 3.4 : Wife’s Working Behavior by Own and Husband’s Education
WIFEWORK WIFE’S EDUCATION
Less or equal HS Some College College More than College
NO 50.00 42.11 40.00 38.10
YES 50.00 57.89 60.00 61.90
Total 100 100 100 100
% in population 50.31 23.90 12.58 13.21
WIFEWORK HUSBAND’S EDUCATION
Less or equal HS Some College College More than College
NO 46.30 42.11 41.67 51.61
YES 53.70 57.89 58.33 48.39
Total 100 100 100 100
% in population 33.96 23.90 22.64 19.50Table 3.5 Wife Education by Husband’s Mother and Husband’s Education
WIFE’S EDUCATION HUSBAND’S MOTHER EDUCATION
Less than HS HS At least some College % in population
Less than HS 21.72 7.56 3.05 13.26
HS 52.25 40.89 28.81 44.17
At least some College 26.03 51.54 68.14 42.57
Total 100 100 100
% in population 45.11 39.65 15.24
WIFE’S EDUCATION HUSBAND’S EDUCATION
Less than HS HS At least some College % in population
Less than HS 48.47 12.72 3.57 13.26
HS 42.62 66.53 31.38 44.17
At least some College 8.91 20.75 65.06 42.57
Total 100 100 100
% in population 15.16 31.54 53.30Table 3.6 Probit whether wife works on mother’s working behavior
Dependent variable is “WIFEWORK”
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
MAWORK .578∗∗ .539∗∗ .708∗∗
(.173) (.184) (.242)
WIFE AGE -.016 -.006 -.020 -.023
(.017) (.017) (.026) (.039)
WIFE EDUC .064 .061 .131∗∗ .157∗∗
(.035) (.037) (.045) (.057)
CHILDREN -.141∗ -.158∗ -.235∗∗ -.317∗∗
(.067) (.069) (.081) (.103)
BABIES -.563∗∗ -.591∗∗ -.459∗∗ -.417∗
(.151) (.153) (.157) (.182)
HUSB AGE .033 .052
(.023) (.032)
HUSB EDUC -.067 -.101∗
(.041) (.050)






Number of observations 250 250 229 165
Pseudo R2 .084 .117 .162 .209
Log/likelihood -157.73 -152.04 -132.17 -90.21
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term and year eﬀect. Model (iv)
also includes husband’s religion dummies and dummies for husband’s self-assesment of family income at age 16.
*Signiﬁcance at 5% level. **Signiﬁcance at 1% level.Table 3.7 Probit whether wife works on mother working behavior
Dependent variable is “WIFEWORK”
Probit Coeﬃcient Robust St. Error Marginal Eﬀects
MAWORK .842∗∗ .272 .323
WIFE AGE -.053 .043 -.021
WIFE EDUC .254∗∗ .079 .100
CHILDREN -.255∗ .117 -.101
BABIES -.571∗∗ .199 -.225
HUSB AGE .061 .036 .024
HUSB EDUC -.173∗∗ .062 -.068
HUSB INCOME -.0000198∗∗ 7.03e−06 -7.80e−06
MAEDUC -.027 .061 -.011
PAEDUC .048 .051 .019
FARM -.610 .561 -.239
SM CITY -.729 .434 -.284
MED CITY -.219 .488 -.087
SUBURBS -1.71∗∗ .516 -.559
LG CITY -1.14∗ .539 -.412
NEW ENGLAND .440 .802 .164
MID. ATLANTIC -.342 .685 -.135
E.N. CENTRAL -.459 .667 -.181
W.N. CENTRAL -.675 .741 -.262
S. ATLANTIC .616 .799 .226
W.S. CENTRAL -1.34 .708 -.472
MOUNTAIN -.213 .712 -.085
PACIFIC .552 .851 .202
Number of observations 159
Pseudo R2 .329
Log/likelihood -73.43
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The regression includes a constant term and year eﬀect.
It also includes husband’s religion dummies and dummies for husband’s self-assesment of family income at
age 16. *Signiﬁcance at 5% level. **Signiﬁcance at 1% level.Table 3.8 Education linear regression
Dependent variable is wife’s years of completed education
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
HUSB INCOME 3.81e-06∗ 3.34e-06∗ 3.16e-06 3.20e-06 7.12e-06 6.26e-06
(1.69e-06) (1.67e-06) (1.69e-06) (1.67e-06) (4.03e-06) (4.09e-06)
HUSB INCOME2 -3.28e-06 -3.41e-06
(2.50e-011) (2.54e-011)
HUSB BIRTHYR .031∗∗ .023∗∗ .026∗∗ .026∗∗ -.0005 .006
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.028) .(028)
HUSB BIRTHYR2 .0003 .0003
(.0003) (.0003)
HUSB AGE .013 .011 .012 .011 -.008 .002
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.047) (.047)
HUSB AGE2 .0002 .0001
(.0005) (.0005)
HUSB EDUC .481∗∗ .445∗∗ .456∗∗ .441∗∗ .435∗∗ .421∗∗
(.017) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.019) (.019)
MAEDUC .093∗∗ .083∗∗ .087∗∗ .075∗∗
(.015) (.017) (.018) (.016)
PAEDUC .051∗∗ .015 .008 .007











Number 2557 2557 2557 2557 2435 2365
of observations
R2 .4016 0.4128 0.4065 0.4131 0.4170 0.4057
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term. Model (v) also includes
husband’s religion dummies and dummies for husband’s self-assesment of family income at age 16. Model (vi) adds
the 9 regional dummies to Model (v). *Signiﬁcance at 5% level. **Signiﬁcance at 1% level.Table 3.9 Education ordered probit regression
Dependent Variable is Education of wife
(i) (i) (iii) (iv)
HUSB INCOME 6.23e-06∗∗ 5.72e-06∗∗ 5.71e-06∗∗ 5.51e-06∗∗
(1.05e-06) (1.06e-06) (1.06e-06) (1.07e-06)
HUSB BIRTHYR .022∗∗ .018∗∗ .019∗∗ .017∗∗
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
HUSB AGE .011∗ .009∗ .010∗ .009∗
(.005) (.005) (.004) (.005)
HUSB HS .792∗∗ .735∗∗ .764∗∗ .733∗∗
(.077) (.078) (.079) (.079)
HUSB COLL 1.74∗∗ 1.60∗∗ 1.63∗∗ 1.57∗∗









Number of observations 2557 2557 2557 2557
Pseudo R2 .1876 0.1988 0.1954 0.2016
Log/likelihood -2071.31 -2042.64 -2051.24 -2035.51
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term.
*Signiﬁcance at 5% level. **Signiﬁcance at 1% level.Table 3.10 Education ordered probit regression
Dependent Variable is Education of wife
Probit Estimate Robust St. Error Marginal Eﬀects
Wife less HS Wife some college
HUSB INCOME 1.05e-05∗∗ 2.61e-06 -1.45e-06∗∗ 4.05e-06∗∗
HUSB INCOME2 -4.28e-11 1.81e-11 5.90e-12 -1.65e-11
HUSB BIRTHYR .010 .017 -.0014 .0038
HUSB BIRTHYR2 .0001 .0002 -1.7e-05 4.75e-05
HUSB AGE .024 .028 -.003 .009
HUSB AGE2 -.0001 .0003 1.54e-05 -4.29e-05
HUSB HS .733∗∗ .081 -.085∗∗ .284∗∗
HUSB COLL 1.53∗∗ .093 -.248∗∗ .535∗∗
MAHS .274∗∗ .062 -.036∗∗ .106∗∗
MACOLL .432∗∗ .091 -.048∗∗ .170∗∗
PAHS .019 .065 -.0027 .0075
PACOLL .267∗∗ .084 -.0327∗∗ .104∗∗
PROTESTANT .040 .210 -.0056 .015
CATHOLIC .041 .213 -.0056 .016
JEWISH .773∗∗ .282 -.062∗∗ .299∗∗
ATHEIST -.175 .241 .027 -.065
AVERAGE -5.91e-04 .058 8.15e-05 -2.28e-04
ABOVE .103 .078 -.0136 .040
Number of observations 2435
Pseudo R2 0.2095
Log/likelihood -1919.87
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The regression includes a constant term. The marginal eﬀects are
computed at the mean for our sample. *Signiﬁcance at 5% level. **Signiﬁcance at 1% level.Table 3.11 Education ordered probit marginal effects: Cohort I to III
Wife less than High School Wife Some College
Cohort I Cohort II Cohort III Cohort I Cohort II Cohort III
HUSB INCOME -2.11e-06∗ -5.95e-07 -1.03e-06∗ 2.88e-06∗ 1.71e-06 6.25e-06∗
HUSB INCOME2 9.18e-12 -1.48e-12 4.93e-12 -1.25e-11 4.27e-12 -2.99e-11
HUSB BIRTHYR -.067∗ .028 .007 .091∗ -.082 -.041
HUSB BIRTHYR2 .0014∗ -.0004 -6.93e-05 -.0019∗ .0013 .0004
HUSB AGE .0032 -.008 -.0016 -.0044 .023 .0097
HUSB AGE2 -5.59e-05 6.64e-05 1.28e-05 7.63e-05 -.0002 -7.77e-05
HUSB HS -.131∗∗ -.103∗∗ -.036∗∗ .213∗∗ .364∗∗ .261∗∗
HUSB COLL -.260∗∗ -.298∗∗ -.173∗∗ .431∗∗ .619∗∗ .560∗∗
MAHS -.063∗ -.036∗∗ -.017∗ .100∗ .108∗∗ .100∗
MACOLL -.074∗ -.044∗∗ -.021∗∗ .133∗ .162∗∗ .154∗∗
PAHS -.018 .019 -.005 .026 -.030 .030
PACOLL -.027 -.017 -.021∗∗ .040 .053 .143∗∗
PROTESTANT -.135 -.003 .033 .156 .009 -.210
CATHOLIC -.111 .0014 .036 .193 -.004 -.184
JEWISH -.129∗∗ -.051 -.043∗∗ .368∗∗ .238 .472∗∗
ATHEIST -.017 .070 .042 .024 -.142 -.178
AVERAGE -.023 .010 -.002 .032 -.029 .011
ABOVE .022 -.011 -.011 -.028 .035 .072
Number of 549 942 856 549 942 856
observations
Notes: Birth Cohort I: [1915-1930). Birth Cohort II: [1930 - 1945). Birth Cohort III: [1945 - 1960).
The marginal eﬀects are computed at the mean for our sample. *Signiﬁcance at 5% level. **Signiﬁcance at 1% level.Appendix A1. Variables Name and Deﬁnition
Variable Name Variable deﬁnition
WIFEWORK Wifework=1 if wife employed full time, or temporary away from
job because of illness, vacation or strike during the week
preceding the interview
MAWORK Mawork=1 if husband’s mother ever worked for pay for as long
as 1 year after he was born and before he was 14
WIFE AGE Wife’s age
WIFE EDUC Wife’s years of completed education
CHILDREN Number of children the husband has ever had
BABIES Number of children less than 6 in the household
HUSB INCOME Husband’s labor earnings in constant dollars (base=1986).
Calculated as midpoint of categorical variable
HUSB BIRTHYR Husband’s year of birth
HUSB AGE Husband’s age
HUSB EDUC Husband’s years of completed education
MAEDUC Husband’s mother years of completed education
PAEDUC Husband’s father years of completed education
WIFE HS WIFE HS=1 if Wife has a High School diploma
WIFE COLL WIFE COLL=1 if Wife has at least some years of College
HUSB HS HUSB HS=1 if Husband has a High School diploma
HUSB COLL HUSB COLL=1 if Husband has at least some years of CollegeVariable Name Variable Deﬁnition
MAHS MAHS=1 if Husband’s mother has a High School diploma
MACOLL MACOLL=1 if Husband’s mother has at least some years of
College
PAHS PAHS=1 if Husband’s father has High School diploma
PACOLL PACOLL=1 if Husband’s father has at least some years of
College
PROTESTANT PROTESTANT=1 if husband was raised as protestant
CATHOLIC CATHOLIC=1 if husband was raised as catholic
JEWISH JEWISH=1 if husband was raised as jewish
ATHEIST ATHEIST=1 if husband was raised in no religion
OTHER OTHER=1 if husband was raised in other religion and/or church
and denomination (i.e. Moslem/Islam, Christian, Buddhism etc.)
BELOW BELOW=1 if husband deems his family income at age 16 to be
below average compared with American families at the time
AVERAGE AVERAGE=1 if husband deems his family income at age 16 to
be at average compared with American families at the time
ABOVE ABOVE=1 if husband deems his family income at age 16 to be
above average compared with American families at the time
COUNTRY COUNTRY=1 if husband lived in open country but not on a
farm at age 16
FARM FARM=1 if husband lived in a farm at age 16
SM CITY SM CITY=1 if husband lived in small city or town
(under 50,000) at age 16Variable Name Variable Deﬁnition
MED CITY MED CITY=1 if husband lived in medium-size city
(50,000-250,00) at age 16
SUBURBS SUBURBS=1 if husband lived in a suburb near a large city
at age 16
LG CITY LG CITY=1 if husband lived in a large city (over 250,000)
at age 16
NEW ENGLAND NEW ENGLAND=1 if husband lived in New England at age
16. Includes: ME, VT, NH, MA, CT, RI
MID ATLANTIC MID ATLANTIC=1 if husband lived in the Mid Atlantic
region at age 16. Includes: NY, NJ, PA
E.N. CENTRAL E.N. CENTRAL=1 if husband lived in the East North Central
region at age 16. Includes: WI, IL, IN, MI, OH
W.N. CENTRAL W.N. CENTRAL=1 if husband lived in the West North Central
region at age 16. Includes: MN, IA, MO, ND, SD, NE, KS
S. ATLANTIC S. ATLANTIC=1 if husband lived in the South Atlantic region
at age 16. Includes: DE, MD, WV, VA, NC, SC, GA, FL, DC
E.S. CENTRAL E.S. CENTRAL=1 if husband lived in the East South Central
region at age 16. Includes: KY, TN, AL, MS
W.S. CENTRAL W.S. CENTRAL=1 if husband lived in the West South Central
region at age 16. Includes: AR, OK, LA, TX
MOUNTAIN MOUNTAIN=1 if husband lived in the region that includes MT,
ID, WY, NV, UT, CO, AZ, and NM at age 16
PACIFIC PACIFIC=1 if husband lived in the Paciﬁc region at age 16.
Includes: WA, OR, CA, AK, HIAppendix A2. Summary Characteristics by Cohort
Variable Sample Means Variables Sample Means
(Std. Dev.)
[1915-1930) [1930-1945) [1945-1960) [1915-1930) [1930-1945) [1945-1960)
HUSB INCOME 37192.65 37951.01 33227.43 PROTESTANT .670 .669 .623
(31688.32) (24340) (22684.22) CATHOLIC .253 .271 .317
HUSB AGE 57.64 45.78 37.69 JEWISH .041 .024 .024
(5.49) (6.62) (4.74) ATHEIST .020 .029 .031
HUSB BIRTHYR 1923.41 1937.83 1950.38 BELOW .361 .275 .225
(3.98) (4.22) (3.93) AVERAGE .478 .536 .555
HUSB EDUC 12.67 13.62 14.32 ABOVE .160 .189 .220
(3.31) (3.08) (2.73) COUNTRY .080 .121 .126
WIFE AGE 52.79 42.23 35.92 FARM .290 .225 .119
(6.90) (7.02) (4.61) SM CITY .335 .329 .341
WIFE EDUC 12.34 13.04 13.62 MED CITY .134 .113 .146
(2.29) (2.47) (2.42) SUBURBS .035 .089 .149
MAEDUC 8.92 10.44 11.5 LG CITY .124 .123 .117
(3.58) (3.12) (2.86) NEW ENGLAND .073 .05 .064
PAEDUC 8.05 9.63 11.33 MID ATLANTIC .195 .164 .196
(3.84) (3.94) (3.78) E.N. CENTRAL .247 .231 .231
HUSB HS .341 .331 .283 W.N. CENTRAL .127 .111 .087
HUSB COLL .387 .521 .649 S.A. ATLANTIC .138 .153 .126
WIFE HS .531 .448 .386 E.S. CENTRAL .067 .073 .052
WIFE COLL .279 .415 .529 W.S. CENTRAL .058 .085 .078
MAHS .233 .381 .520 MOUNTAIN .050 .045 .059
MACOLL .100 .143 .196 PACIFIC .045 .088 .105
PAHS .149 .233 .328
PACOLL .086 .164 .282
No. observations 537 920 826 537 920 826